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YOU HAD TO HAVE BEEN THERE! A SURVEY OF
THE CALIFORNIA COURTS' TREATMENT OF THE
TORT OF NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IN THE MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE AREA
I. INTRODUCTION
The streets of east Los Angeles are filled with the ever-
present sense of death. The clattering of shoes running
through the alleys and the faint sound of a siren are all that is
heard. You are notified by the police that your brother has
been a victim of gang warfare. Rushing to the scene of the
crime, you arrive just in time to see your brother being placed
on a gurney. You hurry to his side, only to hear him utter that
"everything will be fine." Within a few seconds, the paramedics
give your brother an injection. Suddenly, as you watch, his
body goes into convulsions, the paramedics quickly place him
in the back of the ambulance and rush to the nearest hospital.
Two hours later, your brother is pronounced dead.
Unbeknownst to you, the paramedics accidentally admin-
istered the wrong concentration of epinephrine,' and as a re-
sult, your brother suffered a massive heart attack. You were
completely unaware of the negligence at the time of its occur-
rence. Can you recover for emotional distress caused by the
negligent paramedics?
In the past, such claims have received disparate treatment
by the courts. Over the last several decades, the tort of neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) has undergone a
dramatic transformation.! Because confusion and uncertainty
© 1992 by Aideen M. FitzGerald.
1. Epinephrine is a potent stimulant-also known as adrenaline. The use of
this drug causes increased heart rate. Epinephrine is generally prescribed in the
treatment of bronchial asthma, acute allergic disorders and heart block. STEDMAN'S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 476 (5th unabr. law. ed. 1982).
2. See generally William Winter, A Tort in Transition: Negligent Infliction of
Mental Distress, 70 A.B.A. J. 62, March 1984, at 62. In the past, some courts have
allowed recovery for emotional distress as a parasitic tort attached to other pri-
mary causes of action when the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly; claims
for mental distress without a physical impact requirement now have wider accep.
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have surrounded the courts which have confronted the issue of
bystander recovery,' several courts have attempted to clarify
specific instances in which recovery for NIED will be allowed.'
This comment traces the evolution of the tort of NIED in
bystander cases in California from its birth to the present.'
This period encompasses the transition from an era which saw
no independent cause of action for a bystander who witnessed
the egregious acts of a negligent defendant to an era with the
widely accepted, rapidly changing tort of NIED. Specifically,
this comment emphasizes the treatment of NIED claims by
California courts in the area of medical malpractice.6
The analysis focuses on the application of the bystander
recovery rule7 in the medical context.' This discussion also
reveals the unresolved problems and difficulties facing the
application of the tort of NIED to various medical claims. The
analysis confronts the problem of identifying to whom a duty
is owed, determining if that duty has been breached by the de-
fendant and finally, deciding if the breach has caused the inju-
ry to the plaintiff.9 The issue of public policy is also factored
tance. Id.
3. See generally Particia Hardin, Comment, Guidelines Remain Arbitray for
Bystander Recovey for Emotional Distress: Ochoa v. Superior Ct., 20 U.S.F. L. REv. 361
(1986). See also John L. Diamond, Dillon v. Legg Reuisited Toward a Unified Theory
of Compensating Bystanders and Relatives for Intangible Injuries, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 477
(1984). For a list of illustrative cases, see infra notes 37 & 39.
4. For a survey of the evolution of the negligent infliction of emotional
distress [hereinafter NIED] tort in California, see infra notes 51-98 and accompa-
nying text.
5. See infra notes 16-98 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 51-98 and accompanying text.
7. The focus of this comment primarily rests on the area of bystander re-
covery in NIED claims. This form of recovery concerns plaintiffs who witnesses
the negligent acts of the defendant through their senses. The courts have created
two parallel avenues of analysis, the bystander recovery and the direct victim re-
covery, which can both be applied to NIED causes of actions. Under the direct
victim rule of recovery, a plaintiff is, not required to have witnessed the negligent
acts of the defendant but, rather, suffer emotional harm as a direct result of the
negligent conduct. Schwarz v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 276 Cal. Rptr.
470 (Ct. App. 1990). For a complete discussion of the distinction between the
bystander and direct victim rules of recovery, see infra notes 102-15 and accompa-
nying text.
8. See infra notes 99-179.
9. For a discussion of the problem and the application of the tort of NIED
to various medical claims, see infra notes 99- 179 and accompanying text.
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into the equation,0 to complete the analysis of the problems
facing NIED claims in the medical context.
The structure of the analysis is divided into the various
elements required to prove a NIED cause of action." Empha-
sis is placed on the element of duty and the numerous analyt-
ical and proof problems which stem from its application to
medical cases.
In particular, the requirement of contemporaneous and
sensory observation of the injury-producing event has raised
debate when applied in the medical context. 2 The most obvi-
ous problem is the fact that a misdiagnosis or malpractice is
often not realized by the plaintiff until after the fact.' The
difficulty derives from a problem of perception: A plaintiff
may not be physically capable of observing the defendant's
negligent conduct, as in the context of over-radiation. Further-
more, a plaintiff may witness the negligent act but not realize
its traumatic effect.
This comment proposes a new standard of review in by-
stander medical malpractice cases that shifts the analysis from
the element of duty to that of causation. 4 The proposed
change adds clarity and predictability to the analysis of a NIED
claim. The application of the proposal summarizes and dictates
10. For a discussion of policy consideration, see infra notes 177-79 and ac-
companying text.
11. NIED is a negligence claim, and in that respect, all the elements required
to prove a claim for negligence need also be present. The essential elements of
an actionable tort in negligence are the existence of a legally protected right in
favor of the plaintiff, a corresponding duty on the part of the defendant, breach
of that duty by the defendant and injury proximately suffered by the plaintiff. 47
CAL. JUR. 2D Torts § 4 (1959).
12. The focus of this comment mainly concerns the problems of contempora-
neous/sensory observation in medical malpractice claims. For a complete discus-
sion of the issue of observance, regarding the injury-producing event, see infra
notes 135-69 and accompanying text.
13. See James D. McGinley, Comment, California Supreme Court Survey: April
1989-June 1989: To Recover as a Bystander Under a Theory of Emotional Distress, the
Plaintiff Must Suffer Severe Emotional Distress as a Result of Actual Presence and Aware-
ness at an Event Causing Injury to a Victim Closely Related to the Plaintiff Thing v.
La Chusa, 17 PEP. L. REv. 588 (1990). This comment discusses the more difficult
situation which arises when the injury-producing event lasts several minutes, or
even hours. Id. at 600.
14. For a discussion of the proposed idea to shift the emphasis from the
element of duty to that of causation, see infra notes 180-82 and accompanying
text.
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the effect that such a shift in the analysis will have upon poten-
tial claims for NIED. 5
II. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Trend of Bystander Recovery For Emotional Distress
in Calfornia
Over the years, the tort of NIED has undergone many
changes.' Traditionally, bystander recovery was not available.
However, a plaintiff could parasitically attach a claim for men-
tal distress to another existing tort cause of action, such as
wrongful death. 7 Today, independent claims for mental dis-
tress in bystander situations have gained wide acceptance."
1. The Impact Rule
Historically, a plaintiff could not establish an independent
cause of action for emotional harm. The only way that any
plaintiff could maintain an emotional distress claim was to
attach the cause of action to a pre-existing claim against the
negligent defendant. 9 Furthermore, a plaintiff was required
to prove some sort of "physical impact."' Tangible evidence
of the physical impact was required as a means of preventing
fraudulent claims." However, this goal was never achieved,as
expansive application of the concept allowed even the slightest
touching to satisfy the element of bodily harm." Yet, in other
15. For an examination of the applied proposal, see infra notes 186-90 and
accompanying text.
16. See genemUy Claudia J. Wrazel, Comment, Limiting Liability for the Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress: The "Bystander Recovey" Cases, 54 S. CAL. L. REV.
847 (1981). This comment traces the history of NIED from the "impact" rule, to
the "zone of danger" rule and through Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
17. See Winter, supra note 2 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
19. See Winter, supra note 2.
20. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
54, at 363 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988).
21. Wrazel, supra note 16, at 853. See also KEETON et al., supra note 20, at
363. This text discusses the theory that the requisite "impact" was supposed to
afford the desired guarantee that the mental distress is genuine. Id.
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 456 cmt. a (1965). See also
Wrazel, supra note 16, at 847. This comment also suggested that one of the prob-
lems with the physical impact rule is that the slightest physical impact could be
used as a "springboard to get a bystander recovery case into courL" Id. See, e.g.,
Kenney v. Wong Len, 128 A. 343 (N.H. 1925) (plaintiff's physical impact require-
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situations, a person who truly suffered emotional disturbance
was denied recovery because he/she could not prove a physical
impact. Courts ultimately found that this artificial requirement
did not properly limit frivolous actions or support valid
claims."
2. The Zone of Danger Rule
Recognizing the problems of the physical impact re-
quirement, the California Supreme Court in its 1963 decision
of Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co. 4 replaced the "physi-
cal impact" criterion with a locational requirement, known as
the "zone of danger rule."21 This new rule allowed bystanders
to recover in situations where they were not physically impact-
ed, but were located close enough to the accident to fear for
their own safety.26 In such situations involving a negligent de-
fendant and a third party, a plaintiff's proximity to the acci-
dent was a determinative factor of recovery.This newly-established rule did not, however, sufficiently
address all the situations of bystander recovery. Harsh applica-
tion of this rule arbitrarily awarded recovery to one person
witnessing an accident, while it denied compensation to an-
other who had witnessed the same accident. The only differ-
ence between the two potential plaintiffs was their physical
proximity to the accident, not the emotional impact of their
observation.
3. Dillon v. Legg
In 1968, the California Supreme Court dramatically trans-
formed the NIED analysis in its landmark decision of Dillon v.
ment was fulfilled when a mouse hair in her stew touched her lips).
23. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989).
24. 379 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, subnom. Dillon v. Legg,
441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968). Amaya was decided shortly before Dillon. At the time of
the accident, the plaintiff mother was standing near her seventeen month old son,
as a truck came bearing down on him. She shouted at the driver but failed to
make him stop. The mother stood helplessly and watched the negligent driver run
over her son. The court declined the opportunity to broaden the right to recovery
beyond the zone of danger to allow persons outside the zone of danger to recov-
er. Amaya, 379 P.2d at 515.
25. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1963).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 536.
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Legg.28 The court replaced the arbitrary criteria of the "impact
rule" and the "zone of danger rule" with a new set of guide-
lines to assist in determining whether a plaintiff, who was not a
direct victim of the inflicted negligence, could recover under a
"bystander" theory."
In Dillon,s" a young girl was killed by a negligently driven
automobile. Witnessing this gruesome accident were the
decedent's younger sister and her mother. The sister, because
of her close proximity to the accident, was deemed to be
within the "zone of danger." The mother, on the other hand,
was significantly out of the area in which she would fear for
her own safety. Had the supreme court applied the prevailing
"zone of danger rule," the infant sister would have been al-
lowed to recover for the mental anguish of seeing her older
sister perish as a result of the driver's negligence. Yet, the
mother who witnessed the same accident would not have a
valid claim simply because she was located outside the
"zone."31
In allowing the mother to recover for mental distress, the
Dillon court emphasized that the foreseeability of injury to the
plaintiff is a crucial factor in determining whether a defendant
owes a duty, the breach of which is compensable. 2 In an ef-
fort to limit the potentially broad interpretation of this finding,
the court established criteria designed to guide future courts
in a case-by-case analysis of the issue at bar."3 These factors in-
cluded:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the
accident, as contrasted with one who was a distance away
from it.
(2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional
impact upon the plaintiff from the sensory and contempo-
raneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with
learning of the accident from others after its occurrence.
(3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related,
as contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the
28. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
29. For a discussion of the difference between recovery as a "direct victim"
and as a "bystander," see infm notes 102-15 and accompanying text.
30. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
31. 1& at 914-15.
32. Id. at 919.
33. IM at 920.
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presence of only a distant relationship."
The Dillon court explicitly stated that other courts would have
to "draw lines" to elicit areas of liability dependent upon the
circumstances of each case.
s5
4. Post-Dillon Application
Since its ruling, many courts, in various jurisdictions, have
adopted the Dillon guidelines.'M California courts have seen
both an expansion and a restriction of liability regarding by-
stander recovery. 7 With great foresight, the Dillon court pre-
dicted a future of confusion in the area of NIED.55Twenty-two
years later, courts continue to interpret and arbitrarily apply
the Dillon criteria. 9 The most recent California Supreme
Court decision addressing bystander recovery problems is a
1989 case, entitled Thing v. La Chusa"' In an effort to elim-
inate some of the confusion and establish more definitive
guidelines, the California Supreme Court revisited Dillon and
its progeny in order to assess its validity.
The primary objective of the Thing court was to determine
whether the Dillon guidelines were sufficient or if they should
be refined to "create greater certainty in this area of the
34. Id.
35. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 921 (Cal. 1968). See also Joseph P. Towey,
Comment, Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress: Reactions to Dillon v. Legg in Calfor,
nia and Other States, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1248, 1253 (1974).
36. See, e.g., Toms v. McConnell, 207 N.W.2d 140 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973) (a
mother saw her daughter struck and killed by a truck); Leong v. Takasaki, 520
P.2d 758 (Haw. 1974) (a boy saw his step grandmother struck and killed by an
automobile); D'Ambra v. United States, 338 A.2d 524 (R.I. 1975) (a mother saw
her son struck and killed by a mail truck); Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d
1295 (Mass. 1978) (a father suffered a heart attack upon learning of his daughter's
injury in an auto accident and his wife's death from shock upon coming to the
scene of the accident).
37. See infra notes 51-98 and accompanying text.
38. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 924-25 (Cal. 1968).
39. See supra note 37. But see, e.g., Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419 (N.Y.
1969) (a plaintiff who heard the accident and rushed to the scene where her
daughter lay seriously injured, was denied recovery); Strickland v. Hodges, 216
S.E.2d 706 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975) (plaintiffs were notified later of their daughter's
injury in an auto accident and denied recovery because they were neither physical-
ly contacted themselves, nor did they have actions willfully directed at them by
the defendant); Shelton v. Russell Pipe & Foundry Co., 570 S.W.2d 861 (Tenn.
1978) (a plaintiff who was notified later of his daughter's injury in an auto acci-
dent was denied recovery because he was not within the zone of danger).
40. 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989).
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law."4"' The Thing court initiated a trend towards limiting the
circumstances under which a plaintiff may properly state a
cause of action for emotional distress and subsequently recover
damages.4' Specifically, the court attempted to dictate a limita-
tion of bystander recovery of damages for NIED.
In Thing," a mother whose son had been struck by a car
sought recovery for emotional distress. Although the mother
was close to the accident scene, she neither saw nor heard the
accident, but rather, learned of it from her daughter and
rushed to the scene where she observed her "bloody and un-
conscious child."44
The California Supreme Court held that the plaintiff
could not state a cause of action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress as a Dillon bystander, stating:
[T]he societal benefits of certainty in the law, as well as
traditional concepts of tort law, dictate limitation of by-
stander recovery of damages for emotional distress. In the
absence of physical injury or impact to the plaintiff him-
self, damages for emotional distress should be recoverable
only if the plaintiff: (1) is closely related to the injured
victim, (2) is present at the scene of the injury- producing
event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is caus-
ing injury to the victim and,5 (3) as a result suffers emo-
tional distress beyond that which would be anticipated in a
disinterested witness."
In concluding that greater certainty and more reasonable limits
on exposure to liability were possible by narrowing the right of
recovery only to plaintiffs who personally and contemporane-
ously perceived the injury-producing event and its traumatic
consequences, the court noted that "[n]o policy supports ex-
tension of the right to recovery for [NIED] to a larger class of
plaintiffs. Emotional distress is an intangible condition experi-
41. IM at 815. The Thing court admitted to differing opinions within their
own bench but believed that they could "resolve some of the uncertainty ... that
has troubled lower courts, litigants, and, of course, insurers." IM
42. Id. See also infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
43. 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989).
44. Id. at 817.
45. The second factor of Thing with its emphasis on present awareness, is the
primary focus of the analysis. For a discussion regarding the observation criteria
required in NIED claims, see infra notes 135-69 and accompanying text.
46. 771 P.2d 814, 829 (Cal. 1989).
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enced by most persons, even absent negligence, at some time
during their lives."47
The newly-adopted Thing guidelines have reversed the
trend of broad interpretations of bystander recovery. A plain-
tiff no longer has the flexibility of claiming emotional harm
from contemporary perception of the injury. A strict applica-
tion of the Thing guidelines allows plaintiffs to recover if and
only if they are present at the injury-producing event.48 In ef-
fect, all claims are eliminated if the plaintiff is not physically
present to witness the negligent conduct of the defendant. 9
The underlying rationale behind the limitation of by-
stander recovery stems from the fear of falsified claims, drastic
increases in litigation and arbitrary guidelines which may deny
recovery for valid claims.' These guidelines must be tested
under different factual situations in order to assess whether
the courts have accomplished their goal. One area ripe for
reassessment is the area of medical malpractice.
B. Survey of California Courts' Treatment of the Bystander Recov-
ey Rules in the Area of Medical Malpractice
California courts have addressed the issue of bystander
recovery in the context of medical malpractice on several occa-
sions.' As in other tort situations, the courts have also experi-
enced difficulty in establishing a consistent test for recovery of
mental distress in the medical context. Since the ruling in
Dillon, subsequent decisions have reflected both broad and
strict interpretations of its holding." Presently, the modem
trend is towards limiting the situations under which NIED
claims will prevail. The Thing court initiated this new position
47. I& at 828-29.
48. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
49. The requirement that the plaintiff be present at the scene of the
injury-producing event is reminiscent of the "zone of danger" rule to the extent
that the plaintiff's recovery is contingent upon his or her location at the time of
the injurious event. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
50. See generally Wrazel, supra note 16. This comment addresses four fears: (1)
the courts will become overwhelmed with claims; (2) the potentially crushing fi-
nancial liability; (3) the problem with respect to fraudulent/trivial claims; and (4)
the difficulty in finding a rule that is not arbitrary. Id.
51. See infra notes 54-98 and accompanying text.
52. See supra notes 37 & 39.
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and its impact has since filtered into the area of medical mal-
practice."
Prior to Thing, the courts' determination of a NIED cause
of action in medical malpractice cases hinged upon the applica-
tion of Dillon. The first instance where the Dillon theory was
applied to a medical malpractice case, as opposed to the stan-
dard accident scenario, was injansen v. Children's Hospital Medi-
cal Center.' In Jansen,- the appellate court held that the
plaintiff mother was not entitled to recover after watching her
daughter die a slow death as a result of a misdiagnosis.' The
court reasoned that "what was contemplated by Dillon was a
sudden event lasting a short duration.""7 The decision em-
phasized the fact that an injury which occurs over a long peri-
od of time allows for emotional adaptation and adjustment, as
opposed to the shock experienced with an abrupt impact."
This decision imposed a very literal application of the Dillon
factors in its analysis.
Within the past decade the California Supreme Court has
often confronted the issue of NIED in the medical realm."
Contrary to the narrow interpretation of the Jansen court, the
supreme court in its 1980 decision in Molien v. Kaiser Founda-
tion Hospital' focused primarily on the foreseeability issue
addressed in Dillon." The court allowed a husband to recover
against his wife's doctor after a misdiagnosis of syphilis and
further recommendation that the husband be tested for the
disease."" The court explained that there existed a special rela-
tionship between the tortfeasor and the first party injured.'
The defendant hospital and doctor owed a duty directly to the
53. See, e.g., Golstein v. Superior Court, 273 Cal. Rptr. 250 (Ct. App. 1990).





59. See, e.g., Jansen v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 106 Cal. Rptr. 883 (Ct.
App. 1980); Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980); Ochoa v.
Superior Court, 703 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1985); Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medi-
cal Clinic, 770 P.2d 278 (Cal. 1989); Golstein v. Superior Court, 273 Cal. Rptr.
270 (Ct. App. 1990).
60. 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980).
61. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
62. 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980).
63. Id.
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husband of the patient who had been erroneously diagnosed
as having syphilis.' Because of the doctor's misdiagnosis,
which eventually resulted in marital discord, the husband was a
"direct victim" of the doctor's negligence.' The court empha-
sized that it was "reasonably foreseeable" and "easily predict-
able" that such an erroneous diagnosis would produce marital
discord and emotional distress to a married patient's spouse.'
Following the expansive trend suggested by Molien,67 the
California Supreme Court sought five years later to refine the
guidelines under which recovery would be permitted to a by-
stander in medical malpractice cases.' In Ochoa v. Superior
Court; the court granted recovery to a mother who witnessed
the negligent handling of her sick son at a juvenile hall hospi-
tal."'
The Ochoa court focused on the second prong of the
Dillon test, requiring "direct emotional impact" from contem-
poraneous and sensory perception of the accident." Replac-
ing this prong with another concept, the Ochoa court allowed
recovery when the plaintiff observes both the defendant's con-
duct and the victim's injury and is contemporaneously aware
that the injury is caused by the defendant's conduct or lack
thereof.7
The court held that requiring a brief and "sudden occur-
rence," such as an accident, imposed an unwarranted restric-
tion on the Dillon guidelines and unduly frustrated the goal of
64. Id.
65. Id. See also John F. Hedrich & Davidson Ream, When Can a Bystander
Recover? 32 FOR THE DEFENSE (August 1990), at 2-4. For a discussion of the "di-
rect victim" versus the "bystander rule" and its problems, see infra notes 102-15
and accompanying text.
66. 616 P.2d 813, 817 (Cal. 1980).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. The parents of the decedent sued a juvenile facility for the emotional
trauma which they experienced, on seeing their son's medical needs ignored by
defendants, when they visited him. Their son had been admitted to the custody of
Santa Clara juvenile hall, where he apparently caught a cold. He became progres-
sively worse and was eventually diagnosed as having bilateral pneumonia. Mrs.
Ochoa's request to have her son released and seen by her own physician was
denied. Her son's condition continued to worsen. Mrs. Ochoa was forced to leave
the infirmary, and never again saw her son alive. Id. at 5-6.
70. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968).
71. Ochoa v. Superior Court, 703 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1985).
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compensation." Through its decision, the court allowed a
mother to recover for emotional distress even though the
injury- causing event occurred over a long period of time. The
court's analysis focused primarily on the mother's witnessing
the malpractice, seeing its effect on her son and connecting
the malpractice with the injury, despite the fact that the injury
was ongoing."5
Four years later, the California Supreme Court considered
Molien's "direct victim" concept, in Marlene F. v. Affiliated
Psychiatric Medical Clinic." Focusing on the element of duty,
the court held that two mothers could state a claim for emo-
tional distress against a psychotherapist for molesting their
sons although neither one was a bystander witness nor a direct
victim of the tortious conduct. 6 However, damages could be
recoverable only if they established that the defendant
"breached a duty owed to the plaintiffis] that is assumed by
defendant or imposed on the defendant as a matter of law, or
that arises out of a relationship between the two."77
In Marlene F.," two mothers and their sons were receiv-
ing counseling from the defendant psychologist. The purpose
of the treatment was to help resolve "difficulties in the rela-
tionship between mother and son."" During the course of the
treatment, the psychologist sexually molested the boys. The
mothers sued the psychologist for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress, claiming that the molestation of their sons
caused them serious mental and emotional suffering and fur-
ther disrupted their family relationships.'
72. Id. at 6.
73. Id. See also Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989) (the decision in
Thing in effect overruled the holding in Jansen). See supra note 47 and accompa-
nying text.
74. For a complete discussion on the comparison of "direct victim" and "by-
stander" recovery, see supra notes 102-15 and accompanying text.
75. 770 P.2d 278 (Cal. 1989). The plaintiff mothers brought their sons to the
Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic to obtain counseling for family emotional
problems. It was later discovered that the boys had been sexually molested by
their therapist. The mothers sued the clinic for further disruption of their family
relationships and the emotional harm suffered. Id.
76. Id. at 280.
77. Id. at 282.
78. Id. at 278.
79. Id. at 279.
80. Id.
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The California Supreme Court found that the psychologist
had in essence committed malpractice not only against the
sons, but also against the mothers."' The court stressed that
the mothers were also patients and that the purpose of their
treatments was to help resolve intra-family difficulties.'
Only seventeen days later, the California Supreme Court
dramatically transformed the NIED guidelines established by
Dillon v. Legg' with its decision in Thing v. La Chusa. This
case drastically reduced the situations under which a plaintiff
could recover as a bystander for emotional distress. Although
the facts of Things were not in a medical context, the
decision's impact has echoed throughout the holdings of medi-
cal malpractice cases, such as the appellate court's 1990 deci-
sion in Golstein v. Superior Court.'
In Golstein,7 an eight year old boy, Dwight Golstein II,
was diagnosed with curable cancer." He underwent radiation
treatments for his cancer at Children's Hospital of Oakland,
under the care of the treating doctor."
Due to the negligence of the doctor, Dwight received an
overdose of radiation which eventually caused his death.' Pe-
titioners did not observe the radiation overdose, nor were they
aware that their son was being overexposed.9 However, they
were "present and witnessed the results of" the negligent over-
radiation." They observed the "'grotesque,. deteriorating and
worsening condition' of their son 'on a daily basis and ob-
served [his] injuries, suffering and pain ... up to the time of
his death.'"" Thereafter, petitioners sought damages for
81. Id. at 283 n.6.
82. Id. at 282.
83. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
84. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989). For a discussion of the
impact of Thing upon the tort of NIED, see supra note 13, at 588.
85. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989).
86. Golstein v. Superior Court, 273 Cal. Rptr. 270 (Ct. App. 1990).
87. Id.
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wrongful death and for NIED based on the observation of
their son's slow deterioration and eventual death.'
Applying the newly-adopted Thing guidelines, the Golstein
trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend the
complaint on the issue of NIED, reasoning that petitioners did
not state a cause of action because they "neither contempora-
neously observed with their senses the injury-causing event
which caused injury to Dwight, nor had an understanding of
the consequences of that event.""On appeal, the court affirmed the decision of the trial
court, stating that the supreme court ruling in Thing dictates
that the plaintiff must be "'present at the scene of the injury-
producing event at the time it occurs and... then aware that
it is causing injury to the victim.'"' Thereafter, petition for
writ of mandate was denied.97
III. ANALYSIS
It is evident from an examination of the above-discussed
cases that an analysis of the NIED tort is a complicated task. In
order to properly scrutinize this tort in the context of medical
malpractice cases, it is necessary first to return to the tradi-
tional tort principles of duty, foreseeability and causation.
Thereafter, public policy should be considered before complet-
ing a thorough study of this area.
A. The Application of the Bystander Recovery Rule in Medical
Malpractice Cases
Generally, for a plaintiff to recover under a negligence
theory, he/she must first establish that the defendant owes a
duty which has been breached by defendant's negligent con-
duct and that this unreasonable conduct was the proximate
cause of the plaintiffs injury." This assessment can be diffi-
cult in the area of medical malpractice because the application
often becomes complex when the element of duty is extended
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 278 (quoting Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829 (Cal. 1989)
(footnote omitted)).
97. 273 Cal. Rptr. at 270 (Ct. App. 1990).
98. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, at 324-25
(4th ed. 1971).
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to third parties or, because of a special relationship between
the defendant and the bystander plaintiff, is imposed as a mat-
ter of law. Only after the establishment of a duty can a proper
analysis of causation be considered.
B. The Problem of Establishing a Duty in Medical Malpractice
Cases
An analysis of the duty element begins with an examina-
tion of the relationship between the negligent defendant and
the plaintiff. This process encompasses a study of the concept
of foreseeability and related case law which dictates the appro-
priate guidelines used to determine whether a duty exists.
1. To Whom is the Duty Owed?
The difficulty in assessing the element of duty in medical
cases often arises from the problem of identifying to whom
that duty is owed. A duty may be owed solely to a patient.
In other circumstances, a duty may be imposed on a physician,
as a matter of law, resulting from a special relationship be-
tween the doctor and the patient. If this special relationship
exists, the doctor may, by the nature of the commitment, owe
a duty to more than one person, such as other family
members." When a doctor makes a diagnosis of a family
member, it is likely to affect all other members. It is quite ap-
parent that a duty in the medical context could become rather
expansive.
a. Bystander v. Direct Victim Distinction
Case law has developed two parallel theories of recovery
to describe the relationship between the plaintiff and the de-
fendant. A plaintiff can either be characterized as a "direct
victim" or a "bystander.""°' The "direct victim" is a plaintiff
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965) (this duty is imposed as
a matter of law in the form of the physician/patient relationship).
100. Id. For a good discussion of the physician/patient relationship and the
duties extending from that relationship, see Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of
California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (discussing the question of whether a rela-
tionship between a doctor and a patient gave rise to a possible duty on the part
of the therapist to the "victim" of the patient).
101. Schwarz v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 276 Cal. Rptr. 470 (Ct.
App. 1990).
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who has suffered emotional injury as a direct result of a
defendant's negligent conduct, whereas a "bystander" is one
who has witnessed the injury caused by that defendant."°
The Molien court developed the line of cases known as the
"direct victim." In Molien,' 3 the supreme court held that the
defendant hospital and doctor owed a duty to the husband of
a patient who was erroneously diagnosed as having syphilis."°
The court stated that it was "reasonably foreseeable" and "easi-
ly predictable" that the husband would be impacted by the
doctor's negligent conduct." s Therefore, the husband could
recover as a "direct victim" of the doctor's negligence, despite
the absence of physical injury and direct observation. 6
b. Recent Application of the "Direct Victim" Analysis
In Ochoa,'7 the supreme court further expounded on the
notion of "direct victims." In its 1985 decision, the court at-
tempted to explain and limit "direct victim" recovery."° A
mother, who witnessed her son's negligent medical treatment
while confined in a juvenile facility, was not a "direct victim" of
defendant's negligence, such as to enable her to state a cause
of action under the "direct victim" theory." The defendant's
negligence was directed at the decedent, not the plaintiff
mother."0 However, the court reasoned that the mother was
a foreseeable plaintiff, and thus, the defendant owed a duty of
care to her as a Dillon "percipient witness. ""
Four years later, the California Supreme Court once again
considered the concept of "direct victim" recovery in Marlene
F... Focusing on the special relationship between the psychi-
atrist and the mothers, the court reasoned that the doctor
102. Id.
103. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980).
104. Id. at 820.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 819. For a good discussion of the "direct victim" concept, see
Stephan P. Bedell et al, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress in Illinois: A "Fore-
seeability" Proposal, 11 S. ILL. UNIV. L.J. 263 (1987).
107. Ochoa v. Superior Court, 703 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1985).
108. Id. at 9-10.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 10.
112. Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, 770 P.2d 278 (Cal.
1989).
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would be liable to the mothers, as "direct victims," for the
emotional distress he caused her by molesting their sons."'
The court rationalized that since the purpose of the medical
attention was to resolve intra-family difficulties, it would be
reasonably foreseeable that the mothers would be affected by
this behavior."4
2. The Foreseeability Factor as a Component of Duty
The foreseeability element is not restricted to a "direct
victim" analysis. In bystander situations, as addressed in Dillon,
the courts have also found it necessary to factor foreseeability
into the duty equation. In the area of medical malpractice, it is
reasonably foreseeable that a close family member will be sig-
nificantly impacted by a misdiagnosis. For example, if a doctor
erroneously diagnosed a spouse as having AIDS, the immedi-
ate emotional distress arising out of this misinformation is
readily apparent."' In this situation, the physician could pos-
sibly be faced with a NIED claim.
The Dillon decision emphasized that the "foreseeability of
risk [is] of... primary importance in establishing the element
of duty.""" The court believed that the duty owed to a plain-
tiff in NIED cases could be determined by applying the three
proposed guidelines"' and deciding if "the accident and
harm [were] reasonably foreseeable.""'
Post-Dillon decisions have expanded this concept so that
the foreseeability factor has become the sole ground upon
which duty is determined."' In an attempt to limit this ex-
113. Id. at 282-83.
114. Id.
115. The spouse in this example may be potentially distinguishable from the
plaintiff-husband in Molien since the latter was recommended to be tested; see su-
pra note 62 and accompanying text.
116. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 923 (Cal. 1968) (quoting Grafton v. Mollica,
42 Cal. Rptr. 306, 310 (CL App. 1965)). The court commented that: "[s]ince the
chief element in determining whether a defendant owes a duty or an obligation to
[a] plaintiff is the foreseeability of the risk, this factor will be of prime concern in
every case." Id. at 919.
117. Id. at 920.
118. Id. at 921.
119. The Thing court commented that:
Post-Dillon decisions have now permitted plaintiffs who suffered emo-
tional distress, but not resultant physical injury and who were not at
the scene of and thus did not witness the event that injured another,
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pansive application of the foreseeability concept, the Thing
court recognized that "foreseeability of injury, alone, does not
justify imposition of liability."" ° Considering other policy fac-
tors, the Thing court established its own new test for bystander
recovery.'M  The potentially broad spectrum of plaintiffs and
the role of foreseeability have suggested that there is a need to
establish certain limits to this NIED cause of action. It is clear
that there must be some point at which to restrict liability.
However, it is difficult to determine at which point to place
this limitation. The Dillon court attempted to define this point
by establishing guidelines which would limit the situations in
which a defendant had a duty to a plaintiff.
3. The Impact of the Dillon Guidelines as an Aid in the De-
termination of the Duty in Medical Malpractice Cases
Coupled with the traditional limitations set forth by the
foreseeability concept, the Dillon court established guidelines
to assess the duty owed to a plaintiff.' These factors were to
be used in a case-by-case analysis.'
However, the application of the Dillon guidelines has led
to many arbitrary and ad hoc decisions.' Courts have both
expanded and restricted their interpretation of Dillon, leaving
no clear lines by which one could reasonably predict the out-
come of a NIED case. The intent of the Dillon court was to
establish guidelines which would assist in the determination of
a duty.'" Unfortunately, these guidelines have proven to be
unworkable when applied to various situations, particularly in
the medical context.
to recover on grounds that a duty was owed to them solely because
it was foreseeable that they would suffer that distress on learning of
the injury to a close relative.
Thing; 771 P.2d at 819.
120. Id. at 827.
121. Thing v. LaChusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829 (Cal. 1989).
122. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968).
123. Id. at 919-20.
124. The flexibility of the Dillon guidelines has allowed for broad interpreta-
tions. See supra notes 37 & 39 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Krouse v. Graham
562 P.2d 1022, 1029 (Cal. 1977); but see, e.g., Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City
Sch. Dist., 585 P.2d 851, 859 (Cal. 1978).
125. See supra notes 37 & 39 and accompanying text.
126. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968).
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a. Physical Manifestation Requirement
Dillon originally required a physical manifestation of emo-
tional distress."7 The plaintiff would have to allege some sort
of physical harm in the complaint.' However, early interpre-
tations of Dillon paid little attention to this requirement. Ulti-
mately, the court in Molien rejected this criterion arguing that
there was no valid connection between the psychological effect
and physical manifestation of the injury.'" Furthermore, with
advances in science, some agree it may be easier to prove emo-
tional harm without requiring actual physical injury.'"° The
Molien court replaced this requirement with a severity test by
which a plaintiff must prove the degree of emotional harm.'
Later, the Thing court echoed the need to prove the severity of
emotional distress. As one of its newly- adopted guidelines, the
Thing court required the type of emotional harm beyond that
which "would be anticipated in a disinterested witness," but re-
quired no physical manifestation of emotional harm.'
b. Close Relationship to Victim
The only Dillon limitation which has survived harsh criti-
cism is the element of a close relationship between the victim
and the bystander.' This element is relevant to both the
foreseeability concept and to limit the number of potential
plaintiffs who seek recovery for emotional distress. The general
feeling is that one will not be as severely distressed by witness-
ing a stranger's injury. Admittedly, it may be a tragic sight, but




129. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 616 P.2d 813, 820 (Cal. 1980) (abolishing
the physical injury requirement). See also Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 830
(Cal. 1989).
130. Douglas B. Marlowe, Comment, Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress: A Ju-
risdictional Survey of Existing Limitation Devices and Proposal Based on an Analysis of
Objective Ven'us Subjective Indices of Distress, 33 VILL. L. REV. 781, 802 (1988).
131. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 822 (Cal. 1989).
132. Id. at 829.
133. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968).
1992]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
c. Observing the Injury
The most problematic element of Dillon, the requirement
of contemporaneous and sensory observation of the accident,
is set forth in the second prong of the guidelines." This ele-
ment has undergone extensive interpretation. As seen in
Thing,'" the supreme court replaced the second factor of
Dillon" with a more clear-cut element. Under these new
guidelines 7 plaintiffs may recover, if and only if he/she is
present at the injury-producing event.'
Admittedly, the factual patterns in both of these cases are
distinguishable from those of a medical malpractice suit.
However, these criteria have been adopted and applied to
medical cases to assist in the determination of a duty.
Focusing primarily upon the requirement of contempora-
neous and sensory perception, much of the difficulty arises
from an examination of a plaintiff witnessing a physician's
negligent medical treatment of a third party. Often, there is a
problem with witnessing/observing the negligence, since many
events are humanly unobservable, like radiation therapy.
Moreover, observers are not commonly present (or allowed to
be present) for many observable procedures. 9
The problem stems from the fact that observation is diffi-
cult to define when the result of the negligence does not occur
instantaneously, as it would in an auto accident. In the latter
situation, the plaintiff can immediately see the bloody victim
lying helplessly on the tarred pavement. In the former, a pa-
tient may not be affected by the negligent conduct of a doctor
until several hours or days after the negligence has
134. The second prong of Dillon relates to contemporaneous and sensory per.
ception; see supra note 34 and accompanying text. This requirement has under-
gone the most severe scrutiny. Courts have applied both broad and narrow inter-
pretations of this element. As a result, a closer look at this guideline must be
taken.
135. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989).
136. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
137. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989).
138. I. at 829.
139. There are certain medical procedures where persons, other than the pa-




occurred."" Thus, it is necessary to take a closer look at the
observation criterion.
1) How Was the Injury Observed?
A general requirement for potential plaintiffs seeking to
recover emotional distress is that they be a "percipient wit-
ness."' The term encompasses those plaintiffs who preceive
the injury through their senses.4 2 The Dillon court required
close, sensory observation, which is a direct perception of the
event, as contrasted to learning about the accident from a
third person."
The problem pertaining to direct perception is even more
complicated in the medical context. Unfortunately, many inju-
ries incurred in that context are invisible, such as those result-
ing from radiation. Some take a long time to have an effect,
like failing to diagnose an illness. This makes observation diffi-
cult or humanly impossible."
It is evident that there are problems regarding the re-
quirement of perception of the injury. A number of factors
must be considered to determine whether the plaintiff per-
ceived the tortious act. For example, was the plaintiff present
when the resulting injury occurred.' Did the plaintiff ob-
140. See Michael P. Goughan, Comment, Frame v. Kothari: May Plaintiffs Recover
in New Jersey for the Emotional Distress Suffered Due to the Negligent Misdiagnosis of
Third Persons, 35 VILL. L. REV. 477 (1990). This comment discussed the difficulty
in allowing third party recovery for medical misdiagnosis cases. "The nature of a
misdiagnosis is such that its results may neither manifest themselves immediately
nor be shocking. Hours, days, or months may separate a diagnosis, the manifesta-
tion of the injury to the patient, and the family member's observation of the inju-
ry." Id. at 484 (quoting Frame v. Kothari, 560 A.2d 675, 678 (N.J. 1989)).
141. The theory derived from the Dillon case has come to be known as the
"percipient witness" theory. Under this revolutionary theory, bystanders who were
once denied recovery for emotional distress were now eligible to receive damages
if they satisfied the necessary requirements. Hedrich & Ream, supra note 65, at 2.
142. Hedrich & Ream, supra note 65, at 2.
143. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968).
144. This problem was raised by the petitioner in Golstein and was questioned
during oral arguments. However, the petitioner was unable to present a distinction
between the case at bar and a situation where the injury is witnessed by the
plaintiff but the plaintiff does not see or meaningfully comprehend the actual
injury-causing event. Golstein v. Superior Court, 273 Cal. Rptr. 270, 278 n.3 (Ct.
App. 1990).
145. The court in Mobaldi addressed this issue holding that: "[it is observation
of the consequences of the negligent act and not observation of the act itself that
is likely to cause [severe] emotional trauma." Mobaldi v. Regents of the Univ. of
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serve the negligent act itself? Was it humanly possible to ob-
serve the injury?4" These are all important questions to ask
when addressing the manner of observation.
Considering all of these variables, it is easy to understand
why there has been confusion in the courts over the require-
ment of contemporaneous observation. However, most courts
do allow recovery only when the plaintiff has observed an
injury-producing event.'47 It is not essential that visual obser-
vation be found as long as the plaintiff realizes how the harm
has come to the third person.'
The Thing court established clearer guidelines by replacing
the requirement of contemporaneous perception with the pres-
ence of the plaintiff at the injury-causing event.' This rigid
requirement eliminates any potential plaintiff who was not at
the site of the injury. Unfortunately, the court did not specifi-
cally address the case of invisible injury-causing events, which
often occur in instances of medical malpractice.
The Golstein decision was the first application of the new
Thing criterion to the medical field. The case concerned the
very issue of invisible injury.'" The court's decision empha-
sized the Dillon component of perception regarding the
injury-causing event, by denying compensation in cases where
an event cannot be perceived.' The court held that a plain-
tiff must "experience a contemporary or sensory awareness of
the causal connection between the negligent conduct and the
resulting injury." Furthermore, applying Thing, a plaintiff
must be "present at the scene of the injury-producing event at
California, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720, 730 (Ct. App. 1976).
146. The Golstein court considered the issue when an injury could not be per-
ceived or could not be perceived with meaningful understanding. Golstein v. Su-
perior Court, 273 Cal. Rptr. 270 (Ct. App. 1990).
147. See, e.g., Jansen v. Children's Hosp. Medical Ctr., 106 Cal. Rptr. 883 (Ct.
App. 1980); see supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., Krouse v. Graham, 562 P.2d 1022 (Cal. 1977) (The plaintiff saw
a car approaching at a high speed and knew that his wife was at the rear of his
door. The court concluded that the husband was a percipient witness because,
even though he did not actually see his wife killed, he realized how the harm had
come to his wife.) Id.
149. Thing v. LaChusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829 (Cal. 1989).
150. Golstein v. Superior Court, 273 Cal. Rptr. 270 (Ct. App. 1990).
151. Id. at 271.
152. Id. at 278.
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the time it occurs and... then aware that it is causing injury
to the victim."'
As a result of this outcome, the Golstein court has set forth
a strict requirement of knowledgeable observation in the area
of medical malpractice. According to the Golstein court, a
plaintiff must observe and understand the defendant's mal-
practice in order to recover for emotional distress, something
that may not be humanly observable."
2) What Was the Subject of the Observation?
Another problem which arises from the Dillon application
stems from the subject matter of the plaintiffs observation.
The Dillon court did not distinguish whether the witness must
observe the negligent act, the result, or both.'55 The court
simply required "observation of the accident.""
The Thing court attempted to clarify this question by plac-
ing a definite emphasis on the presence of plaintiffs at the
injury-producing event and requiring that they also be aware of
its traumatic consequences.'5 All plaintiffs who were not at
the injury-causing site will be denied recovery.
Golstein appears to have adopted and applied this rigid
requirement in the medical context.'58 The appellate court
denied recovery to the parents of a decedent minor who died
as a result of the negligent administration of an overdose of ra-
diation. The court reasoned that since the plaintiffs did not
observe the radiation overdose and further admitted that dur-
ing the radiation therapy they were unaware that their son was
being overexposed, they should be denied recovery.'59 The
153. Id.
154. Id. at 272.
155. See John D. Burley, Dillon Revisited: Toward a Better Paradigm for Bystander
Recovey Cases, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 931, 944 (1982).
156. Dillon v. I-egg, 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968).
157. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829 (Cal. 1989).
158. See supra notes i51-55 and accompanying text. In dictum, the Golstein
court commented on the Mobaldi holding which analyzed the subject of the
plaintiff's observation. In Mobaldi, the court proclaimed that "'observation of the
consequence of the negligent act itself' is 'likely to cause trauma so severe' as to
allow recovery." Golstein v. Superior Court, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 274 (quoting
Mobaldi v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720 (Ct. App. 1976),
disapproved in part on unrelated grounds, Ochoa v. Superior Court, 703 P.2d I (Cal.
1985)).
159. Golstein v. Superior Court, 273 Cal. Rptr. 270 (Ct. App. 1990).
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Golstein court reasoned that the "true basis for recovery ap-
pears to be the presence of the plaintiff witnessing the imme-
diate, and egregious, [sic] results of the defendant's unseen
negligence.""
3) When Was the Injury Observed?
The Dillon court required contemporaneous observation
of the tortious event."" However, several courts have both
accepted and modified that requirement. 62
In Jansen,'" the court denied recovery for a plaintiff who
observed the "injury" of a child's slow and painful death, due
to malpractice but did not "observe" the "accident.""u The
Jansen court ruled that the injury-producing event itself must
be observed and the event must be of a "sudden" and brief na-
ture capable of sensory perception.6
Overruling Jansen and replacing the second prong of
Dillon, the Ochoa court reasoned that requiring a "sudden oc-
currence" such as an accident imposed an unwarranted restric-
tion on the Dillon guidelines and unduly frustrated the goal of
compensation." 6 The court replaced the old Dillon require-
ment with a new test providing that a plaintiff must observe
both the plaintiffs misconduct and the victim's injury and be
contemporaneously aware that the injury is caused by
defendant's conduct or lack thereof. 67
The Thing court accepted the rigid suggestion of the
Ochoa decision concerning contemporaneous awareness.'" In
effect, this guideline limits recovery by the timeliness of the
observation. Golstein has subsequently adopted this
contemporaneity criterion.
160. I& at 271.
161. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968).
162. See infra notes 164-69 and accompanying text.
163. Jansen v. Children's Hosp. Medical Ctr., 106 Cal. Rptr. 883 (Ct. App.
1980).
164. I. at 24. See also Golstein v. Superior Court, 273 Cal. Rptr. 270 (Ct.
App. 1990).
165. Jansen v. Children's Hosp. Medical Ctr., 106 Cal. Rptr. 883, 885 (Ct.
App. 1980).
166. Ochoa v. Superior Court, 703 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1985).
167. Id.




The third Dillon guideline focuses on proximity." The
location of a plaintiff to the accident was a determinative fac-
tor in the duty analysis. However, the nearness of a plaintiff to
the injured victim often does not accurately reflect the emo-
tional trauma suffered. A mechanical application of this re-
quirement would deny recovery to those familial relations who
are not within a certain spatial distance.
In the situation of a car accident, this factor may have
some merit. It is more shocking to be located close to the
scene as opposed to some distance away. By comparison, the
same rationale can be applied to the medical context. The
impact of being in the same room as the victim when the inju-
ry is inflicted may be more severe than sitting in the waiting
room.
However, this concern was again addressed by the second
factor of Thing.'7" The court in Thing adopted a similar re-
quirement that the plaintiff be present at the injury-causing
event and then aware that it is in fact causing the injury.'
This locational requirement will limit recovery to those accord-
ing to proximity." In addition, this case emphasized the
causal connection between the injury and the effect of the
injury.
C. A Causation Problem: Awareness of the Injuy-Producing Event
Having discussed the duty requirement, we must now turn
to the issue of causation, another necessary element in a neg-
ligence cause of action. If the defendant breaches a duty of
due care owed to the plaintiff, the next factor which must to
be proven is that the injuries suffered were caused by that
defendant's breach.
169. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968).
170. The second factor of Thing allows recovery if and only if the plaintiff is
.present at the scene of the injury producing event at the time it occurs and is
then aware that it is causing injury to the victim." Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d
814, 817 (Cal. 1989).
171. Id.
172. In effect, this requirement will eliminate all potential plaintiffs who are
not present when the negligent act occurs.
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The' flexibility allowed by Dillon and subsequent courts
regarding the element of duty has both positive and negative
attributes. Generally, a broad interpretation of the Dillon
guidelines could afford recovery in many situations. Plaintiffs
who were neither "bystanders" at the scene of the injury caus-
ing event nor "percipient witnesses" who observed the
defendant's negligent conduct have been allowed to recover
under NIED. However, arbitrary attempts to limit the duty
owed by a defendant have proven unsuccessful. Therefore, the
element of causation may prove to be a more effective limita-
tion on potential plaintiffs.7
The Golstein court, adopting the newly acquired Thing
guidelines, decided that the plaintiff must be "present at the
scene of the injury producing event at the time it occurs
and.., then aware that it is causing injury to the victim."'74
This case illustrates one of the first instances where the plain-
tiff was required to appreciate the injury at the time of its
occurrence. The Golstein court emphasized the "causal connec-
tion" between the accident and the injury.'75 This connection
forces a plaintiff to observe the malpractice and realize at the
time that the act is actually causing the injury to the third par-
ty. This last requirement eliminates many potential claims.
Not only must plaintiffs be present, but they must also
understand the impact of the injury. This is a critical factor in
the analysis of a NIED claim. Previously, courts have placed
their primary focus on the duty owed to plaintiffs, and have
attempted to limit liability by curtailing the duty that a negli-
gent defendant owed to potential plaintiffs. Perhaps shifting
the focal point from duty to causation will close the valves to
the floodgates of emotional harm litigation and eliminate the
problem of fraudulent claims in NIED cases.
As in all tort cases, causation is a prima facie element of
recovery. If a plaintiff is unable to prove the direct connection
between the injury to the victim and the resulting emotional
harm, recovery should be denied.
173. For a discussion on the effect of shifting the focal point from the ele-
ment of duty to that of causation, see infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
174. Golstein v. Superior Court, 273 Cal. Rptr. 270 (Ct. App. 1990) (quoting
Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 838 (Cal. 1990) (emphasis added)).
175. Id. at 271.
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The emphasis is not on how the negligent act affected the
victim but rather its effect on the plaintiff-bystander. If the
plaintiff-bystander was unaware of the negligent act at the time
of its occurrence, compensation should be denied.
D. Policy Considerations
After establishing all the necessary tort elements, public
policy must also be considered. Public policy plays an impor-
tant role in our legal system and can greatly impact a court's
decision. In NIED situations, there has been a constant battle
over the desire to compensate deserving plaintiffs and the
logistical need to reduce the scope of claims, many of which
are tenuous.'76 Several factors must be taken into consider-
ation: the cost of increased litigation, the increased effect on
insurance expenses, the overburdening of the judicial system
and the genuine claim of an injured plaintiff.'77 All of these
considerations are critical to an analysis of a NIED claim.
The impact of Thing will be a "dramatic[] cut back on
emotional distress claims" by narrowing the number of poten-
tial plaintiffs.'78 As a result, the claims of some deserving
plaintiffs may also be eliminated because they cannot meet one
of the established requirements. These policy considerations
must be taken into account when facing a NIED cause of ac-
tion.
IV. PROPOSAL
There has been significant judicial interpretation re-
garding the element of duty and several attempts to impose
limitations thereon. Unfortunately, these efforts have produced
inconsistent results. There is consequently a need to shift the
focal point from the area of duty to that of causation.
176. For a good discussion on the underlying policy reasons, see Wrazel, supra
note 16 and accompanying text.
177. See Wrazel, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
178. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989).
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A. Causal Connection
The emphasis on causation should replace the prior atten-
tion given to duty. As seen in one of the most famous tort
cases, Palsgraff v. Long Island Railroad Company, a major ar-
ea of conflict is whether to analyze an issue as one of "duty" or
one of "proximate cause." As Chief Justice Cardozo suggested,
the proper emphasis is on the legal cause, while Justice
Andrews approached the issue as a question of duty."8
Causation is the most important factor in determining if
recovery should be granted for emotional distress claims. The
plaintiff not only must be present or directly affected by the
defendant's negligent act, but must also be aware and appre-
ciate that the negligent act caused the injury. This causal con-
nection should be the determinative factor in all NIED cases.
Absent a showing of causation, recovery should be denied.
The rationale for shifting the emphasis of the analysis to
causation is to limit the vast number of potential plaintiffs in a
more defined and fair way. The courts have struggled for over
twenty years to achieve an equitable solution to this problem.
Reinterpretation of this area of the law has been inconclusive.
Thus, an attempt to refocus the judicial attention to causation
may help in solving some of the problems of NIED claims.
The Golstein court has set the stage by applying the new
criterion established in Thing which calls for awareness of the
injury in connection with the negligent act of the defen-
dant. 8' This shift in analysis appears to indicate a new trend
toward a focus on causation.
Based on this analysis, the immediacy of the causal con-
nection is of utmost importance. A plaintiff must not only be
aware of the negligent conduct but also that such actions are
concurrently causing the injury. This connection is necessary to
satisfy the severity of shock required to prove a prima facie
case of NIED.
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Simply the fact that a plaintiff establishes a causal connec-
tion does not eliminate the need to prove the other elements
of a NIED cause of action. With respect to duty, one must
consider whether there is a relationship between the victim
and the plaintiff. This common bond is either in the form of
familial ties or other special relationships. The importance of
establishing a duty is to determine if the defendant has
breached that duty. In the case of NIED the duty is usually
owed to a bystander. Therefore, the foundation of the duty
must be stated through any of the above-stated relationships,
or imposed as a matter of law.
C. Foreseeability
Factoring into this element of duty is the concept of fore-
seeability. As the Thing court suggested, foreseeability of inju-
ry, standing alone, is not the sole guideline for establishing a
NIED action." This flexible concept of foreseeability has
opened Pandora's box, as to the ease with which one may
prove a cause of action under NIED.
For example, the foreseeability aspect of the duty analysis
will allow both a mother, who is holding her baby while the
reaction to an overdose of drugs takes affect, and a wife, who
has just heard the misdiagnosed information that her husband
has AIDS, to recover. In the first instance, the mother's pres-
ence alerts the doctor to his responsibility of care toward her
through her baby. In the latter, it is reasonably foreseeable that
the spouse will be affected by his negligent act. This flexibility
allows plaintiffs who are not present to recover.
D. Breach
Next, it must be decided whether the defendant's conduct
has breached the duty owed to that bystander plaintiff. Dam-
ages are recoverable in a negligence action when they result
from the breach of duty owed to the plaintiff that is assumed
182. 771 P.2d at 833 (Cal. 1989). The Thing court stated that: "It is clear that
foreseeability of injury alone is not a useful "guideline" or a meaningful restriction
on the scope of a NIED of emotional distress action." Id.
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by defendant or imposed on the defendant as a matter of law,
or that arises out of a relationship between the two."s For
example, a nurse owes a patient a duty of reasonable care in
the administration of drugs, and if the nurse overdoses the pa-
tient, that nurse has breached a duty to that patient.
E. Severity of Distress
Having established all of the tort criteria, a plaintiff must
further demonstrate the seriousness of emotional distress suf-
fered. The shock or fright of witnessing or being a victim of
medical malpractice must be accompanied by a serious degree
of emotional distress. The original purpose of NIED was to
compensate for the shock of witnessing a brutal accident.
When one learns of the negligent act after the fact or discovers
it over a long period of time, there is more time to adjust or
adapt to the news. It is the brutal, abrupt discovery causing
severe emotional distress which should allow for recovery un-
der a NIED claim.
The type of distress which requires legal intervention
should be "so severe that no reasonable person could be ex-
pected to endure it." " This application of the reasonable
person standard will help courts interpret NIED cases consis-
tently. Furthermore, it will aid the fact-finder in making a de-
termination of the culpability of the defendant. By applying
this objective standard to each case, ajury will have some guid-
ance as to the degree of severity of emotional distress required
to satisfy a claim for NIED. This legal test will restrict recovery
for the overly-sensitive plaintiffs if they do not fulfill the objec-
tive requirement.
V. PROPOSAL APPLIED
Referring back to the original hypothetical at the begin-
ning of this comment,' the proposed factors can be applied
to determine if the sister could recover. Considering the fa-
milial connection between the brother and the sister, the
sister's presence at the scene of the injury-producing event and
183. DAN D. DOBBS, TORTS AND COMPENSATION 97 (1985).
184. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1965).
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the act of improperly administering the epinephrine injection,
it appears that the sister may have a viable claim for emotional
distress against the negligent paramedics.
Unfortunately, the answer is not quite that clear. Admit-
tedly, the sister is a reasonably foreseeable plaintiff based on
her sibling relationship. Any injury to her brother would have
a foreseeable impact on her emotional well-being. However,
the facts suggest that the sister was not then aware of the negli-
gence of the paramedics, nor did she appreciate that their
actions directly caused her brother's death. Thus, since the
causal connection is not met, she most likely would be denied
recovery under a NIED claim."
If this outcome appears harsh, remember that the sister
did not actually understand the harm being caused to her
brother. She thought that he was suffering from the wounds
received during the gang warfare exchange. Therefore, would
it seem fair to burden the defendants with this liability? Ad-
mittedly, the paramedics were negligent, but their actions can-
not conclusively be determined to have caused emotional harm
to the sister.
1 In a different factual scenario, the sister may have had a
valid negligent infliction claim. For example, assume that while
one paramedic was administering the injection, the other para-
medic exclaimed, "Stop, you have the wrong amount of medi-
cation." Shortly thereafter, the sister witnessed her brother go
into convulsions and die. According to these facts, the sister
could recover for NIED if she had made the causal connection
between the injury and the paramedics actions.
What makes these two situations different? It is the effect
on the plaintiff that creates the emotional distress. In the first
instance, the sister was not harmed by the paramedics because
she was oblivious to the cause of the problem. In the second
setting, she had knowledge and was directly affected by their
actions, and therefore should recover.
A parallel analogy may be drawn. Consider the tort of
assault."7 If a man comes into a woman's room and kisses
her on the head while she is asleep, and thus unaware, she
186. For an examination of a case with a similar fact pattern and result, see
Wright v. City of Los Angeles, 268 Cal. Rptr. 309 (Ct. App. 1990).
187. A necessary element of the tort of assault is the victim's apprehension.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 114 (6th ed. 1990).
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does not have a claim for assault. However, if she were awake,
she would likely have a valid claim, absent consent. The differ-
ence is in the awareness of the action. While awake and aware,
she may find his actions offensive; while asleep, she is unaware
of his intentions. Therefore, it is clear that the causal connec-
tion is of utmost importance in a NIED claim. The only way to
make a proper determination of the severity of emotional
harm suffered is to ensure that actual harm has been inflicted.
If there is no appreciation that the negligent defendant caused
the injury, the plaintiff has not met the burden of proof.
VI. CONCLUSION
This comment traced the evolution of bystander recovery
for NIED claims from its early stages of development to the
present state of the law in California. The analysis showed that
the development of this tort has been unpredictable and ad
hoc. The application of the NIED cause of action is particularly
problematic in the area of medical malpractice. The proposed
suggestion to shift the focus of the courts' emphasis, from the
area of duty to the area of causation, may prove to alleviate
some of the problems confronting todays' courts in their deter-
mination of compensable NIED claims.
Under the current state of the law, as established in
Thing"s and applied in Golstein,' a bystander plaintiff's re-
covery for emotional distress in a medical malpractice cause of
action is limited. The requirements needed to successfully
plead this cause of action are narrow and rigid.
The tort of NIED is a difficult subject to address because
it often concerns harm inflicted upon a loved one. The obser-
vance of a loved one suffering pain, often causes pain itself.
However, we all suffer pain throughout our lives, most of
which is not compensable. It would be a great injustice to al-
low recovery where no compensable harm has been inflicted.
Aideen M. FitzGerald
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